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How Do I Love Thee, Let Me Count the Days:
Deathbed Marriages in America
Terry L. Turnipseeda
It was early evening on August 18 when they gathered at the bedside of
legendary Washington tycoon Herbert H. Haft, who lay in a glass-enclosed
cubicle in the second-floor intensive care unit of Sibley Memorial Hospital.
Wearied by age and illness, Haft, 83, was jaundiced from liver failure,
his weakened heart maintained a feeble beat and his kidneys no longer
functioned. Short and pugnacious, the white-haired millionaire and former
Wall Street terror who stood just over five feet tall now seemed shrunken and
frail against the expanse of his hospital bed. He had just two weeks to live,
but those who had assembled amid monitors, IV tubes and other hospital
machinery that muggy Wednesday hadn't come to say farewell. They were
there to see Haft marry. His fianc6e, Myrna C. Ruben, 69, wearing an elegant
new pink suit, looked nervous as a judge intoned, "Repeat after me." The
wedding ceremony lasted about 15 minutes. There was no cake. Then the
groom stayed behind as his bride headed out for dinner with their friends.
They threw flowers as she sat down in the restaurant!
INTRODUCTION
S HOULD you be able to marry someone who has only days to live? If so,
should the government award the surviving spouse the many property
rights that ordinarily flow from such a marriage?
Herbert Haft must have known he had days to live when he married
Myrna Ruben from his hospital bed three years ago in Washington, D.C.
Why, then, would he marry? Did he even know he was getting married?
Even if he did understand and acquiesce in it, was he capable at that
moment of understanding the property consequences of marriage? The
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couple first approached a rabbi, who refused to perform the ceremony3
-why?
If this gives you a queasy feeling, think about how Herbert Haft's children
felt. When Herbert's daughter got wind that her father, worth an estimated
fifty million dollars, 4 was going to marry while he lay dying in intensive
care, she was appalled and went to court to obtain an injunction against
the marriage.' The probate judge ordered a court-appointed professional
to determine whether Herbert had the capacity to enter into marriage. But,
alas, the wheels of justice turned slowly in the Probate Division of the
District of Columbia Superior Court (as is the case in many state probate
courts), and Haft was married by the time the court's agent could get to
Sibley Hospital. 6 Haft died exactly two weeks after his marriage.7
The next logical legal step for Haft's children was challenging the validity
of the marriage, or at least the property rights awarded Haft's blushing
bride. Perhaps they were about to do just that when they likely discovered
something seemingly peculiar about District of Columbia law: the only
person allowed to challenge the validity of a marriage (or, by extension,
the property consequences thereof) after the death of one of the spouses is
the surviving spouse!8 Seems incredible, does it not? The expectant heirs
of a dying man (or woman) who marries on his (or her) deathbed cannot
challenge the marriage post-death. Ironically, the one person allowed to
challenge is the only person who has absolutely no motivation to do so.
But, you ask, surely that must be simply some oddity of District of
Columbia law? No. Virtually every American jurisdiction expressing an
opinion on the subject appears to have adopted the same rule.9 How did
this rule come about? What, if anything, should we do to change it? Given
the Supreme Court's rhetoric over the years hailing one's "fundamental
right" to marry," how far can we as a society really go to restrict the ability
of someone, even on her deathbed, to marry?
3 Id.




8 See Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 226 (1934) (citing Sammons v. Sammons, 46
WL.R. 39, 41 (S.C.D.C.)) (District of Columbia case: voidable marriage cannot be annulled
after the death of either spouse); Abramson v. Abramson, 49 F2d 5oi, 503, 504 (D.C. Cir.
1931); Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F2d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Tyler v. Andrews, 40 App.
D.C. 100, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1913); see also Norris v. Harrison, 198 Ead 953, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1952)
(step-grandchildren of a decedent would not have standing to maintain action to annul mar-
riage of decedent).
9 See generally JOHN DE WiTr GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 5o , 66-67 (3d
ed., Matthew Bender 2oo5) (discussing the limitations on challenging a voidable marriage); see
also infra notes 64-88 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 89-111 and accompanying text.
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This article explores these and other related questions. Part I examines
the property consequences of marriage." Part II looks at the distinction
between void and voidable marriage and how the distinction affects
challenges to deathbed marriages." The article then looks at grounds for
attacking a marriage in Part III."3 The next part examines the constitutional
framework for any solution to the problem of deathbed marriages. 4 Finally,
Part IV proposes a theoretical framework for a model act giving heirs and
beneficiaries standing to sue in order to negate the property consequences
that flow from marriage, depending on the level of mental capacity at the
time of the marriage."
I. PROPERTY CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE
Marriage results in many property consequences that vary substantially
from state to state. However, jurisdictions can be generally categorized as
separate or community property jurisdictions.
A. Separate Property Jurisdictions
Forty-one states have separate property regimes.16 Below are some of the
property rights that come with marriage in these states. They include an
I I See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 30-63 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 64-88 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 89-II and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes f1 2-24 and accompanying text.
16 Marital property regimes are classified as either community property or separate prop-
erty. Only nine states currently have a system of community property: Arizona (ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1998)), California (CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2004)), Idaho (IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 32-906 (2003)), Louisiana (LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (1985)), Nevada (NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (LexisNexis 1989)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2
(LexisNexis 1978)), Texas (TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (Vernon 1998)), Washington (WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 2ooo)), and Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 766.OO1 (West
zooi)). Alaska allows spouses to choose whether to be subject to community or separate prop-
erty (ALASKA STAT. § 34-77.030 (1998)). These community property states, however, represent
over one-fourth of the United States population. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TItUSTS,
AND ESTATES 455 (7th ed. 2005). As summarized by Dukeminier:
Community property in the United States is a community of acquests:
Husband and wife own the earnings and acquisitions from earnings of
both spouses during marriage in undivided equal shares. Whatever is
bought with earnings is community property. All property that is not
community property is the separate property of one spouse or the other
or, in the case of a tenancy in common or joint tenancy, of both. Separate
property includes property acquired before marriage and property ac-
quired during marriage by gift or inheritance. In Idaho, Louisiana, and
Texas, income from separate property is community property. In the
2oo7-2oo8]
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elective share, intestacy share, homestead allowance, personal property
set-aside, family allowance, and various federal property rights.
1. Elective Share.-In all but one of these states," often the primary right
obtained in conjunction with marriage is the so-called right of election
against the will encompassed in elective share statutes." Even if there
is a valid will, the surviving spouse is allowed to elect, in a typical state,
one-third of the decedent-spouse's property if the decedent had surviving
issue, or one-half if there were no surviving issue. 9
Obviously, then, even if the decedent spouse had proper testamentary
capacity at the moment of executing an otherwise valid will, the will may
well be defeated in large part by a deathbed marriage, and the elective
share rights that come with it.
2. SurvivingSpouseShare Underlntestay.-If a decedent spouse died without
a valid will, she is deemed to have died intestate. 0 Every jurisdiction has
default provisions that specify who is to get what share of an intestate
decedent's property. Surviving spouses generally receive at least one-third
to one-half of the decedent's property."1
3. Other State Law Propery Rights.-State law bestows several other rights
on surviving spouses. Again, the rights vary, but can include: the family
allowance amount (generally a fixed amount or the amount necessary to
support the surviving family members for a year);"2 placing valuableproperty
other community property states, income from separate property retains
its separate character.
Almost all community property states follow the theory that husband and
wife own equal shares in each item of community property at death.
Id. at 455, 457. Separate property states are simply states that do not have a community
property system.
17 "Georgia is the only state that does not have dower/curtesy, a statutory elective share,
or community property concepts." Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn't I Be Allowedto Leave
My Property to Whomever I Choose At My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start
Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIs L.J. 737, 739, (2006); see also Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the
Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, 32 U. MIAmi L. CENTER EST. PLAN. 9o4 (1998).
18 For a detailed discussion of the history and current workings of the elective share, see
Turnipseed, supra note 17, at 738.
19 Id.
20 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 59.
21 See id. at 63-64.
22 See id. at 422; Verner E Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The
Surviving Spouse, Years Support and Intestate Succession, io GA. L. REv. 447, 468 (1975-1976);
see, e.g., UNIr. PROBATE CODE § 2-404(a) (amended 1993) (granting a reasonable allowance that
cannot continue beyond a year if the estate is inadequate to pay creditors).
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in a tenancy by the entirety; 3 the homestead allowance (provides assistance
to surviving spouses relating to the family home); 4 and the exempt personal
property set-aside (to ensure that certain tangible personal property passes
to the surviving spouse). 5
4. Federal Property Rights.-The federal government affords surviving
spouses numerous property and tax-related rights including: a one hundred
percent estate tax deduction for transfers to United States citizen spouses; 6
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") protection for
qualified retirement plans (surviving spouses must have survivorship rights
if the employee-spouse predeceases, and spouses can only waive this right
in writing and not via a premarital agreement); 7 and Social Security spousal
survivor benefits.2 8 In all, these benefits can be quite substantial.
B. Community Property Jurisdictions
Most of the rights listed above apply to community property jurisdictions
as well, with the notable exception of the elective share right. The latter
is not present in a community property jurisdiction presumably because
the concept of community property is intended to protect the surviving
spouse adequately. Surviving spouses in community property jurisdictions
would, generally, receive less of the decedent's property than their separate
property counterparts in situations where the marriage is short-lived. This
is because the "community" property-the property brought in during the
marriage-is relatively small. The surviving spouse is only guaranteed a
split of the community property, and not the decedent's separate property
if she has a valid will channeling that property elsewhere. 9
23 See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 84,
145-46 (1994)-
24 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 421-22.
25 Id. at 422.
26 I.R.C. § 2056 (1997); see Brashier, supra note 23, at 140-42; Chaffin, supra note 22,
at 465; Pennell, supra note 17, at 905; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, ThE TRANSFORMATION OF
FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 239 (1989)
("tax law (which can be decisive for the estate planning of the well-to-do) increasingly en-
courages dispositions in favor of the surviving spouse by giving such dispositions preferred
treatment").
27 See 29 U.S.C. §§ IOO etseq, DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 420-21; Pennell,
supra note 17, at 905; see also Chaffin, supra note 22, at 465-67 (arguing that protection of a
spouse from being disinherited should come from statutory retirement, disability, and death
programs, and not probate law). Is it odd that Congress has chosen to step into this debate only
with respect to qualified plans?
28 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4O1 etseq; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 419-20; Chaffin, supra
note 22, at 465-67.
29 See generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 455-58 (discussing the rights of a
surviving spouse in a community property jurisdiction).
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II. WHY ARE DEATHBED MARRIAGES VOIDABLE BUT NOT VOID
AFTER THE DEATH OF ONE PUTATIVE SPOUSE?
A. Generally
Conceivably, one could challenge a marriage based on a number of grounds:
improper age, the parties are too closely related consanguineously, mental
incompetence (either permanent or temporary), bigamy, lack of consent
(including lack of ability to consent), fraud, duress, and undue influence,
to name a few.3" In ancient and modern times, some challenges made the
marriage void and others made the marriage voidable.3' The distinction
between the two is important and tells us who may contest the validity of
the marriage and when. In other words, the distinction gives us the standing
rules surrounding annulment proceedings.
Marriages deemed to be void (or void ab initio3") are legal nullities that,
in theory, never existed in the first place.33 In the United States today,
examples of void marriages include: bigamous or polygamous marriages;
same sex marriages in most states; incestuous marriages; and marriages that
include one or more underage persons (the last is void only in a minority of
jurisdictions).-' The putative spouse, the State, or any interested third party
may collaterally attack a marriage on grounds that render it void.35 Attacks
may be made even after the death of one or both spouses.
36
Voidable marriages are valid for all civil purposes unless attacked in an
annulment proceeding by one of the putative spouses. 37 Grounds leading
to a marriage being deemed voidable include: fraud, duress, mental
30 See, e.g., WILLIAM P. STATSKY, FAMILY LAW 181 (2d ed. 1984).
31 Id. at 181-99.
32 Literally "from the beginning" in Latin. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4 th ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 2ooo) available at http://www.bartleby.
com/61/57Aoo I 57oo.html.
33 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 49-50; STATSKY, supra note 3o , at 179-80; see also
Annotation, Unlawful or Invalid Marriage as Void or Voidable, L.R.A. 1916C, 691 (1919) [here-
inafter Marriage as Void or Voidable] ("a marriage is termed void when it is good for no legal
purpose, and its invalidity may be maintained in any proceeding in any court, between any
parties, whether in the lifetime or after the death of the supposed husband and wife and
whether the question arises directly or collaterally").
34 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 50; see also STATSKY, supra note 30, at 181-99 (ex-
plaining various types of void marriages).
35 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 49.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 50; STATSKY, supra note 3o , at 179-80; see also Marriage as Void or Voidable, supra
note 33, at 691 ("[A] voidable marriage may be defined generally as one between parties hav-
ing capacity to contract marriage, but in the constitution of which there is an imperfection, in
that it is forbidden by law, which imperfection can be inquired into only during the lifetime
of both of the parties in a proceeding instituted for the very purpose of obtaining a sentence
declaring it null").
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incompetence (either permanent or temporary), undue influence, sham,
jest, and underage (voidable in a majority of jurisdictions).38 In general, only
the husband or wife can challenge a marriage as voidable. Thus, neither a
third party nor the State may bring a proceeding to deem it invalid, even
after the death of one of the spouses.39 Historically, the right to attack a
marriage as voidable was seen as a personal right maintainable only by a
party to the marriage contract, or by a guardian ad litem where both spouses
are alive but one is under a legal disability.'
38 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 50; STATSKY, supra note 3o , at 181-99. Note that
older common law rules were different in some instances. For example, marriages annulled
because of mental incompetence were void, not voidable, under common law. Annotation,
Marriage of Mental Incompetent as Void or Voidable, L.R.A. 19i6C, at 700 (1919) [hereinafter
Marriage of Mental Incompetent]; see also Johnson v. Sands, 53 S.W.zd 929 (Ky. 1932) (Deceased
husband's mental incapacity at the time of marriage "render[ed] him incapable of entering
into a marriage contract .... Hence there was no valid marriage, and [it] was void from its
inception." The husband's heirs could sue in order to void the marriage). Most states now
have statutes that provide that the marriage of mentally incompetent individuals is voidable
only, though a minority of jurisdictions hold otherwise. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at
59. In general, modern statutes are moving more categories of marriage defects from the void
to the voidable characterization. Marriage as Void or Voidable, supra note 33, at 692. A thorough
discussion follows infra notes 64-88 and accompanying text.
39 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 50; see also 4 Am. JUR. 20 Annulment of Marriage
§59 (2007) ("a third person cannot.., maintain an action to annul a marriage which is merely
voidable").
40 4 AM. JUR. 20 Annulment of Marriage §§ 59,63 (2007).
2007- 2oo8 ]
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The chart below summarizes the general standing rules in the United
States, as they exist today. These rules are discussed in detail in Part III.
PARTIES WITH STANDING WHEN AN ANNULMENT ACTION
TO BRING ANNULMENT MUST BE BROUGHT
ACTION
Suit based on Putative spouse, the Anytime, even after the death
annulment State, or any interested of one or both putative spouses
grounds third party (subject to the relevant statute of
resulting in a limitations)
void marriage
Suit based on Either putative spouse, For putative spouses, anytime,
annulment generally no one else, even after the death of one spouse.
grounds but some states allow For interested third parties, some
resulting in other interested parties states allow suits prior to the death
a voidable to sue before the death of either putative spouse.
marriage of either putative Almost no state allows suits by
spouse interested third parties after one of
the putative spouses dies.
In any case, suit is subject to the
relevant statute of limitations.
Likely you have noted that all of the common grounds that might be used
to attack a deathbed marriage-such as temporary mental incompetence
due to illness, undue influence, fraud, duress or a combination thereof-fall
into the voidable category, thus making it impossible for a decedent-spouse's
heir to challenge a marriage (and thereby the property consequences of a
marriage). Should this be the case? Perhaps there are very good reasons
for these very old-school categories and we should not upset them. Let us
just see about that.
B. Why This Distinction Between Marriages That Are Void and Voidable?
Modern American law seemingly classifies marriage defects as either
void or voidable based upon some perceived "seriousness of the marital
impediment. ' 41 The categorization of marital defects as either void or
voidable began its existence in a significantly less defensible manner.
Deathbed marriages have been around for quite some time, probably
since shortly after marriages began. The term "deathbed marriage" dates
back to the Middle English term "deethbed.' '41 "Death-bed" first appeared
41 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 49.
42 RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICriONADERY (Random House, Inc. 2oo6), available at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/deathbed.
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in print in the epic poem Beowuf (c. 1400). 41 It appeared in books three
more times in the 16th century and was used by Shakespeare in 1604 in
the play Othello." However, it was not until John Norris's PracticalDiscourses
Upon the Beatitudes that the word "deathbed" became associated with the
notion of a belated change of conduct, as in Norris's "Death-Bed Charity"
and "Death-Bed Repentance.
'45
The distinction between determining a marriage to be void or voidable
goes back, as these things tend to do, to the differing approaches of old
English ecclesiastical courts (applying canon law) and temporal courts
(applying common law). 46 Initially, all authority relating to marriage and
the dissolution of marriage "rested exclusively in the Church. ' 47 The
Church, over time, imposed ever-increasing impediments to marriage for
the "corrupt" purpose of raising revenues by charging a special exemption
fee in order to allow couples to marry, notwithstanding the fact that
such marriages technically violated one or more Papal edicts. 48 Marital
impediments became increasingly intolerable to the masses.49
In response, under King Henry VIII, the Crown enacted a series of
statutes granting temporal courts authority to prohibit the ecclesiastical
courts from interfering with marriages, except for those with impediments
specified by statute (civil disabilities).,0 The statutes did not authorize the
temporal courts to determine if a marriage was valid, meaning the power to
avoid marriages remained exclusively with the ecclesiastical courts.5
In time, there came to be a distinction between civil disabilities
enforceable by temporal courts and canonical impediments enforceable
by ecclesiastical courts.5" An adjudicated violation of one of the civil
disabilities resulted in the marriage being made void: these actions could
have been "maintained in any proceeding, either direct or collateral, in any
43 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 305 (2d ed. 1989) available at http://www.oed.com.
44 Id. ("Sweet soul, take heed, take heed of Perjury, Thou art on thy deathbed") (citing
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 5, SC. 2, In. 50-51 (Alvin Kernan ed., Signet Classic 1998)
(622)).
45 Id. (citing 4 JOHN NORRIS, PRACTICAL DISCOURSES UPON THE BEATITUDES 185 (2d ed.
1707)).
46 W.W. Allen, Annotation, Right to Attack Validity of Marriage After Death of Pary Thereto,
76 A.L.R. 769 (2004). Principally, canon law was an amalgamation of Papal decrees interpreted
in a "book of institutes," named the Corpus Junis Canonici, published in 1582 and revised in
1603. Marriage as Void or Voidable, supra note 33, at 690. This book of institutes only bound the
clergy and ecclesiastical courts since the English Parliament had not adopted it. Id.
47 Allen, supra note 46, at 770.







civil court.., either before or after the death of either or both" parties. 3
Civil disabilities, as stated by an English court in 1812, "do not put asunder





[c]ivil disabilities ... make the contract void ab initio, not merely voidable;
these do not dissolve a contract already made; but they render the parties
incapable of contracting at all: ... and if any persons under these legal
incapacities come together, it is a meretricious and not a matrimonial union,
and, therefore, no sentence of avoidance is necessary.
55
In contrast, an alleged violation of a canonical impediment to marriage
in an ecclesiastical court was deemed voidable-actionable only in a direct
proceeding by one of the spouses, and only during the lives of the parties.
5 6
Once one of the spouses died, the marriage was valid forever since it was
not declared invalid during the lives of both spouses,57 apparently because
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction only to "vindicate the divine law rather
than to assert property rights." 8 Obviously, the surviving spouse retained
all support and property rights relating to the marriage despite any apparent
canonical violations.59
Once Henry VIII's Church of England split from the traditional Catholic
Church, no one could appeal to the Roman Pope to annul a marriage.
6
0
At this time, English common law courts gained jurisdiction over actions
yielding both void and voidable marriage declarations.
6
1
In modern England, only a spouse can challenge a marriage as voidable
and only during the lifetime of both parties. 6 Voidable grounds include a
marriage where either party did not validly consent, e.g., if made under
duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or otherwise.
63
As discussed above in Part I.A., supra, the distinction still has very real
meaning in modern America. Prior categorization of a marital defect-no
53 Id.
54 Allen, supra note 46, at 770 (citing Elliot v. Gurr (1812) 2 Phillim. Eccl. Rep. I6, '9,
16I Eng. Reprint, io64, 1o65).
55 Id.
56 Mariage as Void or Voidable, supra note 33, at 69 1. See generally R.H. HELMHOLZ, CANON
LAw AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND (Hambledon Press 1987) (exploring the connection between
canon law and English common law and the role of ecclesiastical courts in this develop-
ment).
57 Marriage as Void or Voidable, supra note 33, at 691.
58 Id.
59 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 49-
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., A. v. B., (1868) 1 L.R.P. & D. 559 (Ct. of Probate) (U.K.) (suit by next of kin
of deceased wife).
63 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 12(c), (d) (Eng.).
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matter how egregious and obvious in a given case-as voidable means that
heirs are stopped cold on a per se basis from challenging the marriages of
a mother, father, or other ancestor. Should this be the case, or is this yet
another lousy legal leftover from old English feuding between the Church
and head of State?
III. WHO HAS STANDING TO SUE TO CHALLENGE
THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE?
Marriage is something more than an ordinary contract affecting the property
rights of the parties; it is an institution in which the public has an interest,
and 'it may well be doubted whether the heirs of [the decedent] could be
heard to question the legality of his marriage.'64
The most important threshold question in a marriage or marital property
rights challenge is standing-who can get into court to sue? Clearly, if you
cannot sue, then neither legal standards nor a case full of egregious facts
will matter. "You can't win if you don't play," as the Powerball slogan goes.
Modern statutes and cases uniformly provide that a marital challenge
based on the standing rules of a voidable (not void) marriage may not be
attacked after the death of either of the parties. 65 In deathbed marriage
cases, all but two or three states use voidable standing rules with the
result that, after the death of one of the putative spouses, no one but the
surviving spouse has standing to challenge the marriage (and, by extension,
the property rights flowing from same). 66
Recall that several marital defects might be claimed in a suit to annul
a deathbed marriage (and thus negate the property rights consequences
of same), including temporary mental incompetence due to illness, undue
influence, fraud, duress, impotency or some combination of these.67 One
could imagine any or all of these grounds coming into play in the Herbert
Haft situation mentioned in the opening (though, of course, we will
never know because Herbert's heirs were not allowed to challenge the
marriage). 68 Of all of the grounds on which deathbed marriages might be
64 Castor v. Davis, 22 N.E. iio, iii (Ind. 1889).
65 See also 4 Am. JUR. 2D Annulment of Marriage § 59 (2007) ("a third person cannot, as a
general rule, maintain an action to annul a marriage which is merely voidable"). See generally,
Allen, supra note 46, § 2 (2004) (discussing attacks on marriage after the death of one party).
66 See infra notes 75-76, 78.
67 See, e.g., STATSKY, supra note 3o , at 181-99.
68 There have been many other infamous cases of deathbed marriages throughout
history. One of the more interesting is that of writer George Orwell who married Sonia
Brownell, a woman fifteen years younger than Orwell. The deathbed marriage "prompt-
ed a frisson of suspicion among friends." Tim Carroll, A Writer Wronged, SUNDAY TIMES,
(London) Aug. 15, 2004, available at http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/life-and-style/article4662o6.
ece?token=null&offset=o (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). Sonia was apparently quite the character.
2oo7-2oo8]
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challenged, the most common is incompetence. A comprehensive statutory
and common law review of standing, vis-A-vis incompetence, is detailed
below to show how these suits (or, more appropriately, nonsuits) often play
themselves out.
Putative spouses must, of course, have the requisite mental capacity
to get married.69 I have heard it joked that the level of mental capacity
necessary to get married is roughly equivalent to that of a vegetable. For
better or worse (no pun intended), this is not far from the truth. Generally,
under common law, the burden of proof is on the party alleging the mental
incapacity of a party to a marriage. In other words, a person is presumed
to have capacity to marry.70 In a relative sense, the capacity required to
marry is less than the capacity required to execute a will (testamentary
capacity), which is less still than the capacity required to execute a contract
or conduct business (for example, the capacity to execute an irrevocable
trust).71 Thus,
MARITAL CAPACITY < TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY < CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY
She "had slept her way around London's intellectual haut monde" and was at Orwell's side
"wearing an extravagant ring of rubies and diamonds bought with one of [Orwell's] blank
cheques." Id. Orwell had a son from a previous marriage, the mother of whom had died
unexpectedly. Id. Thus, instead of Orwell's royalties from Animal Farm and 1984 passing to
his son, they went to Sonia (though the latter point is a complex tale in itself). Id. Carroll sum-
marized Sonia's activities around the time of Orwell's death as follows:
Famously, of course, while Orwell was dying, Sonia was drinking with
her former beau, the painter Lucian Freud. Since then she has been
portrayed as more of a merry widow than a grieving one: setting off for
the Riviera when her husband's body was barely cold, to pursue the
real love of her life, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty;
frittering Orwell's fortune on failed affairs and booze, dying a destitute
and bitter drunk.
Id.
69 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 49.
70 R.S., Annotation, MentalCapacity to Marry, 28 A.L.R. 635 (2004).
71 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 60.
[Elven though a person might have been previously adjudged to be
legally incompetent to handle his or her business affairs, nevertheless
such a person might still be competent to marry, by applying a lesser
test of competency for marriage than for other business purposes, again
to validate the public policy of promoting marriage in general, and to
validate the marital expectations of the parties in particular.
Id. Seealso, e.g., Park v. Park, (1954) P. 89, 92, 110-11 (1953) (U.K.) (decedent had capacity to
marry but the will he executed the following day was invalid for lack of testamentary capacity
-wife gets intestate share); Payne v. Burdette, 84 Mo. App. 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 19oo) (a person
may have sufficient mental capacity to contract a valid marriage, though he may not have
mental capacity to contract generally).
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The legal standards for the requisite marital capacity vary significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction," and their details are outside the scope
of this article. Whether a suit to annul a marriage based on incompetence
is governed by the void or voidable standing rules, however, is very much
within this article's scope. It is the void or voidable status that determines
which parties have standing to sue and when.
Generally under very old common law in the United States, a suit to
annul a marriage due to incompetency was controlled by the void, not
voidable, standing rules as to who could sue and when.73 The older rule is
distinctly in the minority today.74 More recently, states have treated, either
72 Many courts tend to use the "capacity to understand the nature of the [marital] con-
tract" and "capacity to understand the ... obligations and responsibilities of marriage" tests.
See, e.g., Homan v. Homan, 147 N.W.d 630, 631 (Neb. 1967); Forbis v. Forbis, 274 S.W.2d 800,
8o6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955). Some courts use the less rigorous standard of "ability to consent at
the time of the marriage," deleting the additional "obligations or responsibilities" test. See, e.g.,
Young v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 365 P.zd 701, 713 (Colo. 1961). Any standard for incompetence, by
its very nature, is obviously very subjective and cases tend to be quite fact specific.
73 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 59; see also Marriage of Mental Incompetent, supra note
38, at 700-02.
74 GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 59; see supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text; see
also Marriage of Mental Incompetent, supra note 38, at 702-04.
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by statute" or updated common law,76 incompetence as a cause of action
75 ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.010 (2OO6) (in Alaska, marriage cannot be challenged for any
reason after the death of one of the parties); CAL. [FAM.] CODE §§ 2210-221 i (West zoo6) (In
California, an action to annul a marriage on grounds of physical or mental incapacity, fraud or
force is voidable only and must be brought during the life of the putative spouses); COLO .REV
.STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10-1 11(2), (3) (West 2oo6) (In Colorado, children and other third parties
may not attack the validity of a marriage after the death of one of the parties); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 1506 (2OO6) (In Delaware, "in no event may a decree of annulment be sought after
the death of either party ."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3o2(b) (West 1999) ("[i]n no event may
a declaration of invalidity of marriage be sought after the death of either party to the marriage.
.); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-9--2 (West 2oo6) (In Indiana, a "marriage is voidable ifa party to
the marriage was incapable because of... mental incompetency of contracting the marriage");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 14 (West 2oo6) (in Massachusetts, "if the validity of a mar-
riage is doubted, either party may institute an action for annulling such marriage"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:34-1 (West 2oo6) (In New Jersey, marriages may be nullified if either party "lacked
capacity to marry... and has not subsequently ratified the marriage"); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-04-01 (2OO6) (in North Dakota, action on grounds of physical or mental incapacity, fraud
or force must be brought during the life of the putative spouses); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
3105.31(C), 3105.32(C) (West zoo6) (in Ohio, only a party aggrieved may sue to have marriage
annulled on grounds of mental incapacity or fraud); OR. REV. STAT. §§ IO6.030, 107.020 (2OO6)
(In Oregon, a "judgment for the annulment ... of a marriage may be rendered ... [wihen
either party to the marriage was incapable of making such contract or consenting thereto for
want of legal age or sufficient understanding"); Thx. [FAM.1 CODE ANN. § 6. 11 - (Vernon 2006)
(undcr Texas statute, "a marriage subject to annulment may not be challenged in a proceed-
ing instituted after the death of either party to the marriage"); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.130
(2oo6) (In Washington, marriage "is voidable, but only at the suit of the party laboring under
the disability, or upon whom the force or fraud is imposed"); W. VA. CODE § 48-3-103 (2oo6)
(all relevant grounds are voidable).
76 Vance v. Hinch, 261 S.W.zd 412, 415 (Ark. 1953) (marriage of incompetent voidable
and not subject to attack after her death); In re Karau's Estate, 80 P.zd io8, 1o9-io (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1938) (marriage of incompetent held voidable, regardless of the degree of mental
unsoundness, and "thus not subject to collateral attack" after the decedent's death); In re
Estate of Fuller, 86z P.2d 1037, 1038-39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (children of decedent spouse
lacked standing to challenge validity of marriage on grounds of consent even when father
was terminally ill during marriage); Arnelle v. Fisher, 647 So. 2d 1047, 1o49 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (validity of forty-one day marriage, which allegedly resulted from undue influ-
ence from wife, to terminally ill husband could not be attacked following death of husband;
husband's relative lacked standing to pursue annulment of allegedly voidable marriage); In
re Succession of Ricks, 893 So. 2d 98, 1o (La. Ct. App. 2004) ("right to demand the nullity
of a marriage is personal to the spouse whose consent was not free and does not pass on to
his heirs"); Succession of Jene, 173 So. zd 857, 86o (La. Ct. App. 1965) ("right to contest the
validity of a marriage on the grounds of lack of consent is strictly personal to contracting par-
ties and does not pass to their heirs"); Succession of Baltimore, 176 So. 684, 685 (La. Ct. App.
1937) (validity of marriage could not be attacked by anyone after death of one party unless
petition filed before death); Bradford v. Parker, 99 N.E.zd 537, 538 (Mass. 1951) (challenge
to marriage based on incompetency must be filed during lives of both parties to marriage and
mere fact that a husband was under conservatorship at time of marriage "does not require a
finding of mental incompetence"); In re Guthery's Estate, 226 S.W. 626, 626-27 (Mo. Ct. App.
1920) (decedent suffered a morning stroke, was married at i i a.m., died at 7 p.m.; degree of
capacity is irrelevant because marriage was merely voidable and could not be attacked by his
administrator post-death); Gibbons v. Blair, 376 N.W.2d 22, 25 (N.D. 1985) (action to annul
marriage on ground of fraud must be brought by allegedly defrauded spouse while both par-
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governed by the voidable rules, not the void rules.77 Research uncovered
only two jurisdictions that clearly use the standing rules governing void,
not voidable, marriages if mental incompetence or impairment is at issue
in an annulment proceeding.7"
While a few states allow third-party challenges to marriage based on
mental incapacity when the married couple is still alive, states are split on
the question of whether such a marriage can be challenged by a third party
after one or both of the spouses are dead.
79
ties to marriage still alive); In re Estate of Santolino, 895 A.2d 506, 513 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 2005) (decedent's sister could not prevail on claim that decedent's marriage was a nullity
because decedent was impotent, as right was voidable and decedent's right to void marriage
did not survive his death); Tabak v. Garay, 655 N.Y.S.2d 92,93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (plaintiff's
status as deceased husband's relative did not establish interest to void the marriage between
deceased husband and defendant wife; thus, plaintiff lacked standing to bring action); Hall
v. Nelson, 534 N.E.2d 929 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (Decedent's son did not have standing to
sue for annulment of his father's marriage where the marriage had taken place in a hospital
between the father and his live-in companion of 18 years. The father was hospitalized earlier
that day because he had suffered massive coronary attack, and his son brought complaint al-
leging lack of mental capacity and fraud after father's death about one month after marriage);
Dibble v. Meyer, 28o P.2d 765, 766 (Or. 1955) (marriage not subject to attack after the death
of incompetent); Bryant v. Townsend, 221 S.W.zd 949, 950-51 (Tenn. 1949) (marriage of an
insane person who had not been so adjudged was voidable only; right to attack the marriage
subsequently died with the person); L.J. v. V.J.,6 Pa. D. & C.4th 363, 366 (Pa. Com. Pl. 199o)
(voidable marriages may only be annulled by one of the parties to the marriage); Simpson v.
Neely, 221 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (marriage of insane person voidable only,
despite English common law to the contrary); In re Romano's Estate, 246 P.zd 5oi, 504-05
(Wash. 1952) (marriage merely voidable when either party is incapable of consenting); In re
De Conza's Estate, 177 A. 847, 848 (Essex County Ct. 1935) (marriage of incompetent is not
void but voidable only).
77 See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 9, at 59; see also Marriage of Mental Incompetent, supra
note 40, at 702-04.
78 In North Carolina, "[all marriages between ... persons either of whom is at the time
incapable of contracting from want of will or understanding, shall be void." N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 51-3 (West 2oo6). In Kentucky, individuals adjudged as incompetent fall statutorily
into the void category. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (West 2oo6). In Alabama, a 1979 case
held that the administratrix of her deceased mother's estate could seek to annul her mother's
marriage on the ground that the marriage was void because her mother was intoxicated from
before the marriage until her death. Abel v. Waters, 373 So. 2d 1 125, 1128-29 (Ala. Civ. App.
1979). New York has a unique rule that splits the ability to annul the marriage and the ability
to defeat the property consequences of marriage. This rule is discussed later in infra notes
119-21 and accompanying text.
79 Compare Dibble v. Meyer, z8o P.2d 765, 766 (Or. 1955) (suit by incompetent's guardian
to annul the latter's marriage abated upon the death of the incompetent prior to the decree
and could not be revived, for "the cause of suit" did not survive) with Quick v. Quick, 57i
N.E.zd i2o6, izo8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (where complaint seeking declaration of invalidity of
alleged incompetent's marriage was filed prior to alleged incompetent's death, action survived
death; term "sought" in statute providing that "'[in no event may a declaration of invalidity of
marriage be sought after the death of either party to the marriage"' did not mean that an action
commenced before death could not be pursued after death) andClark v. Foust-Graham,615
S.E.2d 398; 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (North Carolina court concluded that since "annulment
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A related question is the validity of a marriage when one or both of the
parties is intoxicated, thus rendering a party incompetent in a temporary way.
Temporary incompetence is similar in nature to some deathbed marriage
situations where the individual is rendered temporarily incompetent by
illness, but was historically considered a competent individual. Intoxication
usually renders a marriage voidable and not void. 0
Duress (or fraud) is the second leading ground for attacking a deathbed
marriage. One might naturally think that if one party to a marriage were
essentially forced to enter into a marriage-consent having been obtained
by duress-it would be void because consent would be lacking."' Oddly,
this is not the case. Although there are a small number of very old (pre-
1905) state law cases supporting the void categorization, modern courts
(and even most older United States courts) have consistently held duress
to yield voidable, not void, marriages.8"
Many of the cases and most statutes mentioned above in relation to
incompetence apply to duress and fraud as well. Apparently, only one state
(Pennsylvania), statutorily treats incompetence 3 as rendering a marriage
void, but fraud and duress as voidable.'
Why did courts and legislatures move away from the void characterization
seen in England and some very old American common law to the current
and widespread voidable characterization? A typical answer comes from a
1922 Florida Supreme Court case Tyson v. State.8 5 In Tyson, the court held a
marriage entered into under duress was voidable, not void. 86 The reasons,
the court said, were "obvious" that:
The legitimacy of children born of such marriages or of subsequent marriages
of the parties, and the inheritance of property which may be owned by
them, are among the cogent reasons for holding marriages attended by
circumstances which may render their validity questionable, as valid and
binding until their invalidity is duly adjudicated. 7
action was commenced on [decedent's] behalf prior to his passing, and substantial property
rights hinge on the validity of the marriage between [decedent] and [his wife], action for an-
nulment "did not abate upon [decedent's] death") (citations omitted).
8o Marriage of Mental Incompetent, supra note 38, at 703-04.
81 J.T.W., Annotation, Marriage to Which Consent of One of Paries was Obtained by Duress as
Void or Only Voidable, 91 A.L.R. 414 (2004).
8z Id.; see also Robert C. Brown, Duress and Fraud as Groundsfor the Annulment of Marriage,
1o IND. L.J. 473, 474 (1935) ("generally held that neither duress nor fraud nor both together
will make the marriage wholly void;" thus fraud and duress not grounds for collateral attack).
83 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3304 (West 2006).
84 Id. § 3305. I cannot imagine a rationale for treating duress and incompetence differ-
ently. To me, it makes no logical sense. Jurisdictions should either hold both to be void or
both to be voidable.
85 Tyson v. State, 90 So. 622 (Fla. 1922).
86 Id. at 622.
87 Id. at 623.
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In a deathbed marriage situation, though, it is highly unlikely that children
will be "born of the marriage," negating the logic in cases like Tyson (which
was not a deathbed marriage case) for deathbed marriage situations. Also,
there is less need in modern society to "legitimize" children born pre-
marriage with a subsequent deathbed marriage."
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY
The word "marriage" is not in the United States Constitution. 9 Indeed,
the Constitution says precious little about regulating domestic relations
generally." Domestic relations are traditionally left to the states.9
88 In bygone eras (and in some cultures even today), it was quite important for children to
be "legitimate." Presumably, an unmarried man and woman with one or more children would
seek a marriage with the death of one of the parties imminent in an attempt to legitimize
past-born issue. An example of this was John Lyon-Bowes, the loth Earl of Strathmore and
Kinghorne, who had a "liaison" with "Mary Millner, a village girl," that bore one son. CHARLES
E. HARDY, JOHN BOWES AND THE BOWES MUSEUM 17-24 (Northumberland Press Limited 1970)
(reprinted in 1982). The Earl married Mary on July 2, 1820, one day prior to his death. Id. at
24. This attempt to legitimize the son failed, as his primary title ended up passing to the Earl's
brother. Id. at 24-25.
For some of these so-called illegitimate children, it was worth a high price indeed to
legitimize his parents' union. Infamous former Venezuelan President Juan Vincente Gomez
was reported to have "at least 50 bastards," though "no shotgun was ever big enough to make
[him] marry." Death of a Dictator, I1ME MAGAZINE, Dec. 30, 1935, available at http://www.time.
com/time/printout/o,8816,848393,oo.htm. Reportedly, one of his illegitimate children was
shot while "attempting to stage a deathbed marriage for his mother." Id.
89 Note that the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment would change this: "Marriage
in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this
Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and
a woman." The Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 40, io8th Cong. (2004). However,
the proposed amendment is not expected to pass Congress any time soon given the current
number of Democratic seats in both Houses.
90 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of United States Constitution Article IV § I-re-
quiring states to credit the "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" [including mar-
riages] of each other-is regarded as the lone Constitutional provision relevant to domestic
relations. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
91 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
One of the principal areas in which this Court has customarily declined
to intervene is the realm of domestic relations. Long ago we observed
that "[tihe whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of
the United States." So strong is our deference to state law in this area
that we have recognized a "domestic relations exception" that "divests
the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees."
Id. at 12 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (zooo)
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Of course, the Supreme Court has decided issues relating to marriage,
including finding and enforcing a "fundamental right to marry," a non-
textual constitutional protection for marriage.9" The Court started this line
of reasoning in 1877 with the pronouncement that there was a "common-
law right" to marriage. 93 During the height of the so-called Lochner era,
the Court said:
Without doubt, [constitutionally-protected liberty] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to
marry, establish a home[,] bring up children ... and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.
95
The Court went on to indicate in dicta that some restrictions on marriage
would surely be unconstitutional. 96
After the Lochner era, the "right to marry" language in Court opinions
kept flowing. In 1942, Justice Douglas wrote: "We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."
97
Judicial decisions regarding marriage soon became entangled with
privacy and reproduction jurisprudence. In the famous Griswold case, the
Court struck down a state ban on the use of contraceptives by enunciating
the "notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."98 The
Griswold decision split procreation from marriage by giving married
individuals a constitutional right to prevention of conception.99 In dicta,
the opinion ended with language widely quoted since:
(arguing that broader Commerce Clause power might lead to regulation of family law, an area
traditionally left to the states); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992) ("domestic
relations exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or
child custody decree").
92 For a very good summary of the Court's jurisprudence in this area, see Stephen L.
Grose, A Constitutional Analysis of Pennsylvania ' Restrictions Upon Marriage, 83 DICK. L. REV.
71 (1979).
93 Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78 (1877) ("Marriage is everywhere regarded as a civil
contract. Statutes in many of the States, it is true, regulate the mode of entering into the con-
tract, but they do not confer the right").
94 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
95 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923).
96 Id. at 401-02 (using as an example the arrangement in Plato's Republic where wives
and children were to be held communally and "'no parent [was] to know his own child"').
97 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
98 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
99 Id. Many years later in Turnerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court made the distinc-
tion between a right to marry and right to procreate even clearer. Jamal Greene, Comment,
Divorcing Marriage from Procreation, 1 14 YALE L.J. 1989, 1996 (2005).
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Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that pro-
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. I00
The Loving case two years later in 1967 finally made it explicit: the Due
Process Clause includes marriage as a constitutional liberty because "[tihe
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'' 1 As had
become a pattern in the Court's decision, the reference to the "freedom to
marry" was absolutely dicta. 02
Over the next eleven years, the Court referenced the right or freedom to
marry multiple times'013 before Justice Marshall wrote what is now considered
to be the right to marry case. °4 In Zablocki, the Court overturned a state
The Turner Court had to evaluate whether prisoners-prisoners!-with
no procreative justification still have a fundamental right to marry, and it
held unanimously that they do. The case demonstrates, therefore, that
marriage is fundamental under the U.S. Constitution not because it pro-
vides a setting for heterosexual procreation but because it solemnizes
a social relationship that individuals regard as fundamentally important.
Id. Turner also de-linked marriage from privacy because prisoners do not enjoy constitution-
ally-protected privacy rights. Carlos A. Ball, Symposium: Gay Rights after Lawrence v. Texas, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1202 (2004).
Ioo Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
ioi Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
1O2 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (Loving "could have rested solely
on the ground that the statutes discriminated on the basis of race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause"); see also GLENDON, supra note 26, at 81 ("But for this expansive rhetoric,
which .. .went beyond what the decision of the case at hand actually required, Loving v.
Virginia would have been an unremarkable application of the Equal Protection Clause ....
But with this language, the case casts doubt on the validity of much state regulation of mar-
riage").
103 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-83 (1971) (court fees may not be used
to prevent poor persons from filing for divorce); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)
("[Oinly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy .... [This personal privacy]
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage") (citations omitted); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that free-
dom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting LaFleur with approval); Smith v. Org. of
Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ("The individual's freedom to
marry and reproduce is 'older than the Bill of Rights"') (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
But see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 48 (1977) (federal government is allowed to penalize a
person for marrying, upholding federal law terminating Social Security benefits if one married
a person ineligible for the same benefits).
104 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375.
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statute denying a marriage license to anyone delinquent on child support
payments. 05 Marshall said that the state must not prevent a class of persons
from marrying;'0 6 he distinguished Califano v. Jobst0 7 by indicating that, in
that case, the government imposed a "reasonable regulation that [did] not
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship..
. ., 108 Important for our purposes was Marshall's statement from Zablocki that
the "Social Security provisions [at issue in Califano] placed no direct legal
obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married, and ... there was no
evidence that the laws significantly discouraged ... any marriages.""c°
While government is normally prevented from interfering with practices
typically associated with the personal aspects of marriage (sexual behavior,
child-rearing, living arrangements) government has long-recognized
a right to adjust and regulate the consequences of marriage (intestacy,
testate inheritance, child support, divorce). Zablocki, then, provides a
constitutional overlay with which any proposed deathbed marriage solution
must comply. Solutions that prevent or severely limit deathbed marriages,
or retroactively revoke the legitimacy of the marriage itself, may be suspect
under Marshall's reasoning."' On the other hand, solutions that sever the
property consequences of marriage from the legitimacy of the marriage
itself seem to meet what I am calling the Califano exception to Zablocki.Y'
V. SOLUTIONS
[I]t is but reasonable that these unhappy persons, who are prohibited
by law from making any binding contract for the merest pecuniary trifle,
should be protected from the effects of a covenant of so high a nature,
105 Id. at 387.
uo6 Id. at 386-87.
107 See Califano, 434 U.S. at 48 (upholding a federal law terminating Social Security ben-
efits if one married a person ineligible for the same benefits).
io8 Zablocki, 434 U.S at 386.
io9 Id. at 387 n.12.
11o Note that if challenged under Zablocki, New York's approach-referenced in infra
note 121 and accompanying text-might well be struck down.
iii One such example can be found in In the Matter of the Estate of Epperson, 679 S.W 2d
792 (Ark. 1984). In an opinion written by the now-infamous Webb Hubbell when he was
Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, the court upheld a statute as constitutional,
against a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge, that precluded a spouse from
asserting a dower or curtesy right by taking against a will unless that spouse had been married
to the decedent continuously for a period in excess of one year. Id. at 793. "Individual and
government interests in this limitation include discouragement of deathbed marriages, and
the classification bears a rational relationship to that objective." Id. at 794.
For a number of reasons, however, I do not support such a bright-line rule in deciding
property consequences. I argue only for the ability of heirs to have standing to challenge the
property rights of a marriage after the death of one of the parties within a reasonable period
of time after the marriage.
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which never could be entered into by the other party without some base or
sinister design. If it would be hard that the issue of such marriages should
be deemed bastards, it would be as much so that human beings without
reason, or their families, should be the victims of the artifice of desperate
persons who might be willing to speculate on their misfortunes.
z
A. Possible Solutions
A number of potential solutions might address the "problem" of deathbed
marriages, and the attendant consequences of property disposition at
death, including: (1) requiring more safeguards in the marriage process
itself to help deter undue influence and ensure sufficient capacity
(requiring more witnesses, videotaping of the ceremony, the attendance
of medical professionals, the assignment of mandatory guardians ad litem);
(2) increasing the capacity required to marry, perhaps to the level of
testamentary capacity; (3) shifting to a presumption of incapacity if one
party dies within a certain amount of time after the wedding; (4) adopting
the Uniform Probate Code's elective share principles giving a surviving
spouse very little or nothing by right if the marriage lasts less than a certain
amount of time;"1 3 and (5) prohibiting weddings in hospitals and similar
facilities. Certainly, there are likely many more options along these lines.
One solution listed above that should be discussed in a bit more detail
is requiring some period of time that the union must last in order to receive
the property rights flowing from the marriage. For example, the federal
government requires nine months of valid marriage in order for a surviving
spouse to receive federal social security surviving spouse benefits.'1 4 Some
states have similar rules." 's The reasoning behind such policies seems
both fiscal (the time requirement tends to limit the number of claims) and
deterrent in nature (decreasing the incentive for an end-of-life marriage
designed simply to obtain this and other financial benefits flowing from
being married). While good reasons undoubtedly exist, this type of bright-
line solution smacks of being arbitrary and would be over-inclusive. There
are many reasons why people die, and it is probably the exception rather
than the rule that both parties to a marriage would know that death was
imminent. Certainly for unforeseen deaths, there seems no legitimate
policy argument supporting the automatic revocation of marital property
i Iz Inhabitants of Middleborough v. Inhabitants of Rochester, 12 Mass. 363, 365 (1815).
113 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201, 2-204 to 2-207 (990).
1 14 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(e) & (f) (2006) (establishing criteria for widow and widower ben-
efits); 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(i)(E) & (g)(i)(E) (zoo6) (defining widow and widower). There are
several other ways to qualify as well. For example, the ninth month requirement is waived if
surviving and decedent spouses have at least one child together. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 402
& 416 (2000) (outlining eligibility for Social Security survivor benefits).
1 15 For example, Minnesota law requires that a public employee be married for a year
before certain survivor benefits will be paid. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 353.657(i) (West 2006).
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rights if one of the parties lives less than a certain amount of time. (Indeed,
the Social Security code should probably be revisited in this regard).
States should not rush to change the fundamental system of
requirements they have in place to determine the validity of marriages,
and it is quite possible that many of the above solutions may face federal
and state constitutional challenges as violative of the "fundamental right to
marry." 116
In contrast, the recommended solution proposed below does not require
such fundamental changes, nor does it infringe on one's right to marry. It
suggests only a change in the standing requirements as to who may sue and
when, leaving intact the body of a state's laws-both statutory and judge-
made-surrounding the requirements for, and validity of, marriages.
Finally, why exactly should there be anything preventing one of proper
capacity, under no duress or other physical or mental impairments (all key
points to my argument), to marry on their deathbed for the sole reason of
providing all the property rights that flow from marriage to a beloved other?
As the Supreme Court of Washington put it in 1927:
Much stress has been laid by the appellant upon the claimed fact that
the marriage alone almost conclusively shows incompetency upon the part
of the decedent. It is said that for a woman who is in her last sickness to
marry a man [thirty] years her junior is, to say the least, unnatural. But this
must depend upon the circumstances of the case. We have already noticed
that for several years he had lived most of the time at her home; that he
had cared for her during all of her sickness; that she was not on good terms
with her relatives in this country; that she did not wish them to inherit any
of her property; that she had expressed a desire that Donohue should have
it all; and that for several years she had wished to marry him. Under such
circumstances it would not be unnatural if she desired to marry him for the sole
purpose that he might inherit through her. Instances of such conduct, while not
common, are not at all unknown. Marriage sometimes takes place upon the
death bed of one of the parties, with full knowledge of the participants that
neither of them will ever be able to be a spouse in other than name, and
that for a very short space of time, perhaps but a few minutes. But the right
to contract such a marriage, if the mind is capable of contracting, has never
been denied.
The world at large may look askance at such a union, but the law, which
does not concern itself with the incongruity thereof, looks only to the
question of legal obstacles, and, if none there be, must sanction it as within
the rights of the parties to contract if they see fit."17
116 See supra notes 89-i iI and accompanying text.
117 In re Donahue's Estate, 255 P. 370, 370-71 (Wash. 1927) (emphasis added).
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B. Recommended Solution
States and the federal government create, generally by statute, all of the
property rights associated with marriage. Presumably, government could
sever these rights from a marriage under certain prescribed circumstances,
leaving the marriage intact but stripping away the property consequences. ,18
New York, in fact, does just this (though in a different way than I would
recommend). While there are many grounds for annulling a marriage in
New York that make a union void and not voidable (allowing heirs to
challenge a marriage post-death),' ° the surviving spouse's right to elect
against the will or take via intestacy is not disturbed even if a marriage is
annulled post-death.2 ° I would argue, however, that the opposite should
be true for policy reasons, and as pointed out in Part IV"2' if New York's
1i8 This has been done for various reasons throughout history, including one interesting
deathbed marriage legislative effort in colonial Hong Kong near the close of the nineteenth
century. In modern America, a handful of states have bestowed many of the state-law based
marital property consequences of marriage to same-sex couples who enter into civil unions
that are not recognized as marriages as that term has been traditionally used.
Apparently, it was very common for European men who were economically active in
Hong Kong during the late nineteenth century to keep a paid mistress. Hong Kongs Deathbed
Marriages, BlogTheTalk.com, http://www.blogthetalk.com/zoo5-1 2-o i-blogthetalkarchive.
html (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). Indeed, one police estimate in 188o stated that seventy to
eighty percent of women in Hong Kong were prostitutes or "women of easy virtue." Id. Many
dying men would marry their mistress "to make up for their past misdeeds as they prepared
to meet their maker." Id. The Attorney General of Hong Kong put into place a regime that
appeared to sever the relationship between marriage and the property consequences thereof:
The rule in this colony and in England is that a marriage revokes a will.
The Secretary of State has directed that if this Ordinance was intro-
duced there should be a provision inserted that a deathbed marriage
should not have the effect of revoking a will. The Secretary of State has
not exactly stated what his reasons are but I could very well imagine
myself that a man might be under the influence of religious fervour and
do possibly what his religious advisers or priests may tell him is his duty,
and it is thought fit that a marriage under such circumstances should
not revoke any previous provision which he had made possibly in good
health for the benefit of his family or relatives.
Id.
i 19 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I40 (Consol. 2007) (suit to annul a marriage based on men-
tal incompetence, fraud, duress, or consent by force may be maintained by a relative of the
impaired party even after the death of said party).
120 See Bennett v. Thomas,327 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 197i) (even where dece-
dent's sons, suing individually and as executors of their mother's estate, alleged with sufficient
proof a cause of action to void their mother's marriage to her surviving husband, this would
not defeat the surviving husband's election right) (citing N.Y EST. POWERS & TRuSTS LAW §
5-1.2(a)(i) (Consol. 2007).
121 See supra note ii o and accompanying text.
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approach were ever challenged by a clever attorney using Zablocki, it might
well be ruled unconstitutional.
Two classes of individuals should have standing to contest the property
consequences of a marriage after the death of one of the spouses. First
are the heirs under state law, i.e., those individuals who would take some
portion of the decedent's property if she died intestate (without a will).
Second, if the decedent died with a valid (or arguably valid) will, then those
individuals who take property under the will should also have standing.
In no instance would this proposal allow an action to nullify the
marriage itself. I would simply allow post-death attacks on the property
consequences flowing from the marriage.
As discussed above,"'2 most states stratify required capacity into three
categories: (1) contractual capacity (highest); (2) testamentary capacity
(middling); and (3) marital capacity (lowest).
If the plaintiff can show by an appropriate evidentiary standard that
the decedent spouse did not have testamentary capacity (middle level
of the three) at the time of the marriage, then all property consequences
flowing from the marriage would be invalidated, including, but not limited
to, the elective share (which is relevant in all separate property jurisdictions
but Georgia"2 3 ). If the decedent dies without a valid will, then she will be
deemed, for the purposes of determining property rights, to have died
intestate and unmarried. If she dies with a valid will,2 4 then the elective
share law (or community property law) will not be applicable, and the
decedent will again be deemed to have died testate and unmarried for
purposes of determining property rights. Obviously, any other contractual
documents executed during this state of diminished capacity will be
void as well, since all would likely require a higher level of capacity than
testamentary capacity. This might include the execution of a trust, deed, or
a document purporting to make a gift.
The logic for such a regime flows as follows: If the decedent spouse did
not have testamentary capacity, she could not have executed a valid will.
If a decedent cannot understand the property consequences of a will, then
the decedent cannot understand the property consequences that flow from
122 MARITAL CAPACITY < TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY < CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY-See supra
notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
123 Seegenerally Turnipseed supra note 17, at 739 (discussing the benefits of eliminating
dower, curtesy, and the elective share).
124 To be valid, of course, the will must have been signed at a time when the testator had
testamentary capacity, which, as previously discussed, is generally greater than marital capac-
ity. Thus, if the will in question is signed roughly at the same time as the marriage, and the
testator is adjudged not to have had the capacity required under my approach (testamentary
capacity), then by definition the will is invalid. Of course, in some circumstances in certain
jurisdictions, it is possible that a prior will signed at a time when the testator did have the
requisite testamentary capacity would then be revived. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note
16, at 267-69 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE §2-509 (1990)).
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marriage (though one may very well understand other less complicated
consequences of marriage).
If, on the other hand, the decedent is adjudged to have had testamentary
(middling) capacity but not contractual (highest) capacity, then the property
benefits flowing from marriage such as the elective share should be allowed.
If the decedent spouse had the ability to understand and execute a will
(even if she did not in fact execute a will), then in theory she would have
had the ability to understand the property consequence of marriage. This
approach would not, however, validate any documents executed during the
time of the marriage that require contractual (highest) capacity, including
the execution of trusts, deeds, gift instruments, etc.
Finally, if the surviving spouse wins the battle and the decedent spouse
is adjudged to have had contractual capacity, then no property consequences
of the marriage should be disturbed and all documents executed during
this time should be validated.
In any of the above scenarios, there should be a statute of limitations
for challenging the property consequences of marriage. In determining
the proper length of time, certainty of property distributions in an estate
should be balanced against equity to the heirs who, perhaps, should not
be expected to act immediately upon the marriage or death of a parent.
Perhaps a year from the date of the marriage (not the death) would be an
appropriate balance. Of course, the property consequences of the marriage
may be challenged during the lives of both spouses as well as after the
death of a spouse.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) should work to prepare a model act for adoption by the states
and the District of Columbia. My proposed solution would negate any
"fundamental right to marriage" arguments since the marriage would
remain valid. Also, my solution leaves each state's long-established body of
law surrounding a marriage's requirements and validity undisturbed.
CONCLUSION
"There is no greater inequality than the equal treatment of unequals."'1 5
Individuals on their deathbeds have just as much right to marry as anyone,
and if competent and under no duress, the parties to the marriage certainly
should have protection under the law. Protection should be appropriately
shaped to avoid harassment of widows and widowers.
However, I simply cannot see a valid argument for denying a decedent-
spouse's heirs (those who would take the decedent's property if he or she
died unmarried and intestate) and beneficiaries (those who would take
125 ANTON MENGER, DAS B0RGERLICHE RECHT UND DIE BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN 30
(4th ed., 19o8) (translated from German).
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under the decedent's valid will, if any, absent a spousal election) the right
to challenge the property consequences of a suspect marriage, especially
when that challenge is based on traditional grounds that might naturally
flow from a deathbed marriage.
Ironically, a decedent on their deathbed may not have the legal capacity
to enter into a contract but can get married. It is only reasonable that these
poor people and their heirs and beneficiaries should have state protection
against a surviving spouse taking some or all of the decedent's property.
Protection of heirs and beneficiaries is necessary where a surviving spouse
may have few legitimate motives for entering into a deathbed marriage,
particularly in light of the surviving spouse's ability to take some or all of
the decedent's property.
The current incentives are off kilter. A greedy potential spouse has
every incentive to find a minister or officer of the law willing to marry them
off to a wealthy sick person and no legal incentives not to try it. No matter
how ugly the situation, a marriage becomes set in stone with no person
other than the surviving spouse allowed standing to seek redress in a court
of law upon the death of one of the spouses. Allowing, in an appropriate
way, heirs and beneficiaries to challenge the property consequences of a
suspect marriage puts in place the proper disincentives before attempting
to take advantage of one of feeble mind and spirit.
If the property consequences are allowed to stand, victims will continue
to abound in deathbed marriage situations where consent is lacking: the
decedent, her family, and society generally. Just imagine how you would
feel losing an expectancy in such circumstances.
Let each state legislature enact a deathbed marriage act sooner rather
than later. Only then can the ghosts of the Herbert Hafts, and their heirs
and beneficiaries, finally rest in peace.
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